This study uses national survey data in federal election years from 1996 through 2004 to examine voter registration and voting. It shows that racial/ethnic disparities in socioeconomic resources and rootedness in the community do not explain overall group differences in electoral participation. It contradicts the expectation from an assimilation perspective that low levels of Latino participation are partly attributable to the large share of immigrants among Latinos. In fact net differences show higher average Latino participation than previously reported. The study focuses especially on contextual factors that could affect collective responses of group members. Moving beyond past research, significant effects are found for the group's representation among office holders, voting regulations and state policies related to treatment of immigrants.
This study uses national survey data in federal election years from 1996 through 2004 to examine voter registration and voting. It shows that racial/ethnic disparities in socioeconomic resources and rootedness in the community do not explain overall group differences in electoral participation. It contradicts the expectation from an assimilation perspective that low levels of Latino participation are partly attributable to the large share of immigrants among Latinos. In fact net differences show higher average Latino participation than previously reported. The study focuses especially on contextual factors that could affect collective responses of group members. Moving beyond past research, significant effects are found for the group's representation among office holders, voting regulations and state policies related to treatment of immigrants.
Abundant research demonstrates the effects of personal background characteristics on political participation, such as age, education and residential stability. Such characteristics, often described as indicators of "resources and rootedness," are fungible: they enhance political participation regardless of group membership. This research focuses instead on how group membership, defined by race, ethnicity and nativity, structures political participation above and beyond such personal characteristics. We use a large national sample, compare four major racial/ethnic groups, and test for differences between immigrants and natives in every group, including non-Hispanic whites. This design allows us not only to identify persistent group differences but also to document the unexpected high level of participation for Latino immigrants, after controlling for other factors. The analysis also draws attention to several dimensions of the political context, which we term the "group context of participation." This is the first nationally representative study to show evidence of increased participation for blacks where there are co-ethnic officials (i.e., political empowerment) and evidence that state voter ID policies dampen turnout.
Sources of Group Differences in Political Participation
Studies of political participation at the individual level suggest that political participation is associated with individual resources of time, political experience and money (Verba et al. 1993) . Scholars have found that people who are locally rooted are more likely to mid-1990s). Obstacles to voting by blacks continue to stimulate litigation and policy debate. Yet blacks have been found to have distinctively high rates of voting, overcoming deficits in socioeconomic and other resources (Tate 1991 (Tate , 1993 . This phenomenon has been attributed to group consciousness and mobilizing institutions specific to black communities such as the black church (Harris 1994; Brown and Brown 2003) and civil rights organizations (Antunes and Gaitz 1975) . Similar processes that could shape political consciousness, encourage group identity or invite mobilization have been discussed for other groups (Bueker 2005; Cho 1999; Cho et al. 2006; Gay 2001; Jones-Correa 2005; Leighley 2001; Ramaskrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Timpone 1998) .
A prominent hypothesis derived from this reasoning is "political empowerment" (Bobo and Gilliam 1990 ) -the argument that voting is encouraged by increased numbers of black elected officials who can promote mobilization and enhance feelings of solidarity. Washington (2006) found that black candidates for the House of Representatives had a positive impact on black voting, but a countervailing increase in white turnout voting against the black candidates. Pantoja and Segura (2003) also found support for this hypothesis, showing that greater numbers of Latino legislators slightly decreased political alienation among Latinos in California and Texas. We test whether political representation affects registration and voting not only for blacks but also for Latinos and Asians.
We consider for the first time at the national level two other aspects of the political environment that are particularly likely to affect Latinos and Asians. One is general public attitudes toward immigrants. Van Hook, Brown and Bean (2006) found higher rates of naturalization in more welcoming states. We expect similar effects for voting. A second factor is state restrictions on immigrants' access to welfare services. Van Hook showed that immigrants were more likely to naturalize in states with more restrictive policies, suggesting an instrumental effort to gain better access to services. A parallel effect could be to promote registration and voting.
The historical black experience with discriminatory voting policies calls attention to other dimensions of the group context of participation. First, participation could be enhanced by voting rights legislation. Existing studies have yielded mixed results. Jones-Correa (2005) reported that Asians and Latinos were more likely to vote in states that offer bilingual voting and registration materials. By contrast, Ramaskrishnan and Espenshade (2001) found that minority rights provisions did not significantly affect voting among immigrant Latinos.
The political system's more general "rules of the game" can also influence participation. We examine three kinds of rules. One question is how long before an election a person must register in order to vote. Jones-Correa (2001) found no significant impact, but Burden et al. (2010) found a strong negative effect of restrictive policies (see also Leighley and Nagler 1992; Timpone 1998) . A second question is provision for absentee voting. Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) and Jones-Correa (2001) both found that restrictions on absentee voting decrease turnout, while allowing people to vote by mail increases turnout. But Burden et al. (2010) found negative effects.
Recently a third type of regulation has become prominent in policy debates: requirements to show identification prior to voting. Provisions for photo identification are spreading. One study found that strict voter identification requirements depressed voting turnout in 2004, and that this effect was especially pronounced for minority voters (Eagleton Institute 2006; Burden et al. 2010; Muhlhausen and Sikich 2007) .
Research Design
Our purpose requires us to use a nationally representative sample that includes members of all of the major racial/ethnic groups (like Bass and Casper 2001; Bueker 2005; Ramakrishnan 2005 ). We rely on the Current Population Survey in the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 . In these years the November survey included a voting and registration supplement. It also recorded the nativity and citizenship status of respondents, facilitating generational comparisons. Pooling six years of data provides adequate samples in each generation for each of four major racial/ethnic categories.
The CPS also records geographic location; the smallest identifiable geographical unit of residence is the Metropolitan Statistical Area. For this study, contextual variables constructed from the 2000 U.S. Census summary tape files and other sources were merged with CPS data based on state or MSA/PMSA of residence. The MSA definitions used in the 2004 CPS data differ from prior years; we have recoded these to correspond as closely as possible to the definitions in earlier CPS years and in the 2000 U.S. Census. Table 1 provides a summary of variable definitions from all data sources. The outcome variables are self reports of voting or being registered for the November election in a given year. Citizens ages 18 and above were asked: "In any election some people are not able to vote because they are sick or busy or have some other reason, and others do not want to vote. Did (you/name) vote in the election held on Tuesday, November _?" A follow-up question is asked of those who did not vote: "(Were you/Was 'name') registered to vote in the November __ election?"
Dependent Variables: Registration and Voting
The wording of these questions is designed to diminish stigma associated with non-voting or non-registration (Bueker 2006) . Presser, Traugott and Traugott (1990) have shown that the CPS contains less misreporting than other surveys such as the NES (see also Ramakrishnan 2005) . Other studies employing validated data cited by Ramakrishnan (2005) found no significant differences by nativity or generation in the reliability of self-reported voting. However, Shaw, de la Garza and Lee (2000) found Latino over-reporting in a validated voting study in Texas, California and Florida.
Group Membership: Race/Ethnicity and Generation
Race and ethnicity are represented by four broad categories constructed from the CPS race and Hispanic origin questions. The race question allows respondents to select one of five racial categories ("White, Black, American Indian, Aleut or Eskimo, Asian or Pacific Islander or something else"). Respondents were not given the option to select We also use information about birthplace and parental birthplace to measure generations. Those born outside of the United States are 1 st generation. Those born in the United States with at least one parent born outside of the country are classified as members of the 2 nd generation. The remaining 3 + generation cases are individuals born in the United States whose parents were also born here. Table 2 provides a starting point for the analysis based on our pooled sample of citizens ages 18 and older. It shows a "turnout gap" (Citrin and Highton 2002) between Latinos and Asians, on the one hand, and blacks and non-Hispanic whites, on the other. This gap is due mainly to differences in voter registration (10-13 points), with an additional deficit in voting by Latino registered voters (5-7 points less than other groups). The table shows that Asian immigrants and children of immigrants were 10-12 points less likely to vote than those in later generations. The opposite effect is found among Latinos, whose foreign-born citizens had modestly higher voting turnout (due to greater likelihood that registered voters actually vote). This finding is a first example of effects that turn out to be contingent on group membership.
We elaborate on these initial findings in multivariate analyses where registration and voting are treated in turn as dependent variables. We present one set of models in which members of all four racial/ethnic groups are pooled, which allows us to identify the group differences net of variations in other factors, and to show how the population as a whole is affected by contextual factors such as electoral rules that are not group-specific. Surprisingly, one key result is to upend the expected hierarchy of group participation, placing first-generation Latinos above non-Hispanic whites. We then estimate separate models for each group, adding variables representing important elements of their context of participation. Our intention is two-fold: demonstrating the importance of contextual conditions and showing which of their effects are group-specific.
Measures of Socio-Economic Resources and Rootedness
The multivariate models include several indicators of resources and rootedness (listed in Table 1 ). 1 Educational attainment, family income and home ownership are the socioeconomic status indicators. Demographic variables include age, marital status, number of children under 18 in the household, gender and residential mobility (years at the current address). (Note that, because education is reported only for persons ages 25 and above, the age category of 18-24 must be interpreted both as a category of age and as an indicator of persons without a reported education.) All indicators of greater resources and rootedness (higher education and income, home ownership, older age, being married, female and having kids) are hypothesized to lead to increased political participation.
Assimilation Indicators
To examine the assimilation hypothesis we constructed three categories of generation in the United States. In the pooled analysis, generation is combined with race/ethnicity to create a series of 12 dummy variables. Another related indicator is linguistic isolation. This is the only language measure available in the November CPS, and it indicates whether a person lives in a household where only Spanish is spoken. We used this household variable in our models for Latinos, based on the assimilation hypothesis that linguistic isolation would reduce participation.
The Group Context of Participation
A weakness of the CPS for our purpose is the lack of explicit indicators of group consciousness or other relevant attitudes. We therefore turn to other sources to create variables that reflect various aspects of the context of participation. We use 2000 U.S. Census data to capture key information about demographic context at the level of the metropolitan region. 2 The year 2000 is at the midpoint of our 1996-2004 CPS data, and the census is the most reliable source for metropolitanlevel population variables. The metropolitan variable reported here is the ratio of the median household income of each racial group in the MSA to the median income of households headed by non-Hispanic whites. This is a measure of relative affluence or poverty that could show whether (net of their own socioeconomic standing) members of relatively poorer groups would participate less.
Measures of political context were drawn from a variety of sources. The test of the empowerment thesis for Latinos, Asians and blacks is based on office holding at the level of metropolitan regions. Information about Latino office holders is from the 2000 directory prepared by the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO 2000) . This directory includes elected and appointed public officials at all levels. Listings of black elected officials at all levels were provided by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. We examined several ways to code these data, treating the total number of co-ethnic political officials within each MSA as an interval scale or as a set of up to 10 categories to test for non-linear effects. We found that a simple dichotomy adequately reflects the observed relationships: 0-5 (the reference category) or more than 5 representatives. The measure for all groups is for the year 2000, midway in the 1996-2004 period that we study.
Other indicators of the context of participation are measured for states. Some are rules about voting and registration that could affect participation by members of any group. A key variable of this type that has rarely been studied before is voter identification policy. The question is whether or not a respondent lives in a state requiring prospective voters to show some form of personal identification before casting a ballot. Forms of identification required or requested may include photo or non-photo ID. We draw here mainly on the classification of policies by state from reports published by the Election Reform Information Project ( The Election Reform Information Project and the Eagleton Institute used slightly different classification systems with five categories. We collapsed these into a simple dichotomy based only on the maximum requirement: does the state request documentary evidence at the polls of the prospective voter's identification?
(For a discussion of other dimensions of ID requirements, see Eagleton and Moritz 2006.) Two additional indicators of electoral rules are drawn from the Task Force on the Federal Election System (Hansen 2001) . These are the availability of early voting and the flexibility of absentee voting policies, both of which are expected to facilitate participation. Tucker and Espino (2007) also provide information about the number of counties within each state that are covered by bilingual voting ballot provisions, as mandated by the Federal Voting Rights Act, potentially increasing participation by Latinos and/or Asians. We used these data at the state level to construct three categories reflecting the amount of "coverage" by these provisions: (1. no coverage (meaning no counties are required to comply with the bilingual ballot provisions); (2. some coverage (meaning that some counties offer bilingual ballots by law); and (3. full coverage (meaning that all counties offer bilingual ballots by law). This ballot variable indicates the significant presence of non-English speaking populations and a political-institutional climate formally designed to promote linguistic minority participation.
Additional variables measure features of the political context at the state level that are particularly relevant to immigrants. First is a measure of "immigrant receptivity" that is intended to capture public attitudes toward immigrants. The original scale was developed for metropolitan areas by De Jong and Tran (2001) , using data from the General Social Survey in the years 1995 to 1997. This measure was expanded to the state level and converted to standardized scores by Van Hook, Brown and Bean (2006) . Second is a measure of the "social policy safety net" for immigrants, an index developed to capture the spread of social services and welfare available to non-citizens by Zimmerman and Tumlin (1999) . This index measures immigrant access to benefits in 12 separate social policy areas, including post-1996 access to TANF, Medicaid and Food Stamps. We collapse the original four-category measure into two categories, the least restrictive states (where the safety net is "most" and "somewhat" available) vs. the most restrictive.
Election year is included to account for the historical particularities of each electoral contest. Presidential election years (1996, 2000 and 2004) are expected to have higher turnout. One additional measure of the impact of group-specific mobilization, or group specific reaction to racial discrimination, is a dummy variable identifying cases in which the respondent lived in California during 1996. This variable is intended to test speculation that anti-immigration legislation -California's Proposition 187, enacted in 1994 to deny undocumented immigrants' access to social services, health care and public education -would have a mobilizing effect on naturalized citizens in the subsequent 1996 election (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001) , especially for Latinos (Shaw, de la Garza and Lee 2000) .
Finally, we include variables indicating whether the person lives in an identifiable metropolitan area, lives in a non-metropolitan region, or lives in a metropolis for which we could not match the CPS's MSA code. These dummy variables are included simply as control variables, and we do not seek to interpret these coefficients.
Analytical Procedures
We report the results of logit models of both voting and registration. 3 We selected only potential voters: citizens (including both U.S. born and naturalized foreign born) ages 18 and older in the year of the survey. In order to correct for autocorrelation between household members, we also randomly selected one person per household (for the group-specific models this is done after selecting by race/ethnicity). The sample for voting analyses included only individuals who report having registered.
We first present results for a model that combines persons from all four groups. We then present separate models for each race/ethnicity. In all analyses, cases are weighted by the CPS "second stage/final step" weight. Because these weights artificially inflate the overall sample size, we divided them by 1,000 so that cases are weighted properly in relation to one another, but the overall sample size is close to the original unweighted number.
There are two other concerns with our estimates from logistic regression models. First, it is necessary to correct the standard errors of coefficients for contextual variables to account for the clustering of sampled cases by metropolitan area or state. We explored two procedures for this correction: the Huber/White procedure (the robust cluster option in Stata) and a full multilevel model. Some results are the same using either option, but more consistent effects for absentee voting and the welfare safety net are found with the Huber/White approach. Because these two contextual variables are substantively important, we report these coefficients but with the proviso that the same effects are not found in multi-level models. The second potential problem arises from the large number of predictors that are defined at the state level. With only 51 cases (50 states plus the District of Columbia), it is desirable to limit the number of these variables. We accomplish this by a stepwise procedure, beginning by entering each state-level variable into the model by itself (with the full range of individual-level predictors), then examining models with two, three or more of these variables in combination. The most robust results are for voter ID requirements and group political representation. The models reported include only those predictors that had significant effects in a consistent direction after these two variables were entered.
Results
The overall levels of registration and voting by race/ethnicity and generation were presented in Table 2 . We turn now to multivariate analysis to discover whether differences by race/ethnicity persist after introduction of controls, what other resource, political context and group-specific factors affect these outcomes, and how these may vary by race/ethnicity. Net of other factors, are there racial and ethnic differences, and is there a significant difference in political participation across generations? Let us first compare these groups in the 3 rd generation. With the non-Hispanic white 3 rd generation as the reference category, 3+ generation blacks are substantially and significantly more likely to register and to vote. The coefficients are large, representing odds of both registering and voting that are more than 50 percent higher than those of whites. Latinos in the 3+ generation are moderately but significantly less likely to register and vote than whites. Asians in this generation are much less likely to register (with odds only two-thirds as high as whites). After they are registered they are not significantly less likely than whites to vote, but their coefficient (-.095) is similar to the coefficient for Latinos (-.151). Hence among members of the "native" generation and controlling for other variables, the racial/ethnic hierarchy of participation puts blacks at the highest level, followed by whites, then Latinos and Asians.
Group Membership: Race and Generation Effects in Pooled Models
These models do not provide significance tests of differences between groups within the 1 st and 2 nd generation, but the size of the coefficients offers a guide to how they stand. In the 2nd generation the results are generally consistent with those for the 3+ generation. Whites are most likely to register (b =.137), followed by blacks (b = -.067), Latinos (b = -.224) and Asians (b = -.616). For voting, the relative positions of blacks and whites are switched, again followed by Latinos and Asians.
It is in the 1 st generation that there is a more surprising result. All coefficients for registration are negative, meaning that first-generation immigrants of all racial/ethnic background are less likely to register than are third-generation whites. The least negative coefficient is for blacks, followed by Latinos, whites and Asians, in that order. For voting the relative ranking is the same. The positive coefficients for first-generation blacks (.262) and Latinos (.214) mean that these immigrants are even more likely to vote (after registering) than third-generation whites. The white coefficient is negative (-.216), and Asians again have the strongest negative coefficient.
Assimilation Effects
These results in Table 3 can also be read in terms of the effect of generation within each group, but a better test is provided in the group-specific models in tables 4-5 where additional contextual variables are taken into account and all parameters are allowed to vary across groups. Table 4 presents results for every group for registration; Table 5 , for voting. The results are much more complex than anticipated by assimilation theory.
For registration (Table 4) 
Resources and Rootedness
Education More than BA (reference) Less than high school. Table 3 -here it is the 1 st generation that is most likely to vote, while there is no significant difference between the 2 nd and 3+ generations. These findings show interaction effects between race/ethnicity and generation that support no simple theoretical model. In most comparisons, apparently whites' overall parity with blacks as seen in Table 2 , is due to their advantages in other background characteristics that have been controlled in the multivariate models. All else equal, blacks participate more in terms of both registration and voting than do whites. Asians' higher overall participation than Latinos is due to the same compositional differences. But all else equal, Asians in every generation are less likely to register than Latinos. If registered, they are less likely than Latinos to vote except in the 3+ generation.
Also relevant for the assimilation perspective are the findings for Latinos on linguistic isolation. We find that those who live in Spanish-speaking households are less likely to register; but surprisingly they are substantially more likely to vote.
Effects of the Context of Participation
The pooled models in Table 3 also offer evidence of the overall effects of the context of participation. None of these measures of context, except for voting year, show significant effects for registration in the all-races model (for the sake of parsimony Table 3 omits a number of non-significant predictors such as bilingual ballots and immigrant receptivity). Voter ID requirements sharply reduce the odds of voting. People in states that allow absentee voting are substantially more likely to vote (a 25% increase in the odds). And residents of states with a stronger immigrant safety net are also significantly more likely to vote. 4 The election year also has strong effects. Registration and voting are both lower in 1998 and 2002, the non-Presidential years, than in 2000. Considering only the Presidential election years of 1996, 2000 and 2004, there is a clear upward trend in registration and voting. California in 1996 had a significantly higher registration than in 2000, but lower voter turnout -not consistent with the expectation of heightened participation in that year with a highly publicized debate on immigrant issues.
Group-specific Effects of Social and Political Context
Tables 4 and 5 allow us to see how the context of participation may differentially affect members of different racial-ethnic groups, and also to introduce contextual variables that are specific to each minority group.
The black, Latino and Asian models include a measure of relative group economic position in the metropolitan context: the group's median income in comparison to that of non-Hispanic whites in the metropolis. Controlling for individuals' own socioeconomic status, we expected participation of minorities to be depressed in metropolitan areas where their group's income (as a ratio to whites) is low. However, strikingly, for blacks, Latinos and Asians the coefficient for registration is negative. And there are no significant effects on voting.
Similarly the measure of co-ethnic political representation is included only in the models for the three minority groups. The effect of having more than five co-ethnic public officials in the metropolitan area is positive and very strong for blacks, resulting in an increase of more than 30 percent in registration and more than 40 percent in voting. There are no significant effects for Latinos (although in the multilevel model there is a positive effect on Latino voting). For Asians, there is an unexpected negative effect on registration and no impact on voting. One possible interpretation of the positive effects for blacks is that higher levels of voting by group members contribute to greater co-ethnic representation (a reversal of the causal order). This interpretation is buttressed by the fact that higher residential isolation (which implies that minority voters are likely to be more concentrated in certain electoral districts) is associated with higher political representation and voting. This is why residential isolation could not be included in these models. However these are results at the individual level, which are net of several strong control variables. They can be translated only indirectly into associations at the level of electoral districts (at the local, state or federal level).
Other measures of political context are included in the models for all four groups. Voter identification requirements have a substantially negative impact on the voting of all groups except for Asians (though there is no significant impact for registration on any group). Particularly strong negative effects are seen for blacks and Hispanics: a decrease in voting by 18 percent and 22 percent respectively. Even whites show dampened turnout associated with voter ID policies. Yet for Asians, strikingly, voter ID has the opposite effect, boosting turnout by nearly 30 percent. This is an intriguing instance in which Asian participation patterns markedly differ from that of other groups.
More liberal absentee voting policies increase the odds of voting for whites, Latinos and Asians, although there is no effect for blacks. The only significant effect on registration is a surprising negative coefficient for Latinos.
Greater immigrant access to a social service safety net is the other state-level predictor that has some significant effects. These are positive for white, Latino and Asian voting. There are also strong positive effects shown for Asian registration: an increase in the odds of registering by almost 30 percent. There is no significant effect on registration for any other group and no significant effects at all for blacks.
The last measure of political context included in the analysis is the dummy variable for the 1996 general election in California (note that there is a 1996 effect shared by all states, and this dummy variable represents additional variation for California residents). Apparently the conditions present in California in 1996 were associated with higher levels of white and Latino registration, but this variable shows countervailing negative effects on voting for both groups. Only Asians showed the expected boost in voting while no effects were seen for black registration or voting. Table 6 summarizes the findings on contextual effect for all races and for each group-specific model. It includes variables that were omitted from tables 4-5 that we examined and found to have no significant effects: early voting, bilingual ballot provisions and immigrant receptivity in public opinion.
Socio-Economic Resources and Rootedness
Although the effects of what we term resources and rootedness are not the main concern of this study, they are clearly important predictors of political participation. Aside from generation and race/ethnicity, Table 3 shows significant and theoretically important effects of people's resources, and these are confirmed in the group-specific models. As found in previous research, having more resources and indicators of stronger connections to the local community increases the propensity of registering and voting for all groups. There is a uniform relationship between socioeconomic status and registration/voting for all groups. The higher a person's education or income level, the more likely the person is to register and vote. Compared to renters, homeowners are also more likely to register and vote in almost every model (the exception is the model for Asian voting where the coefficient is insignificant).
Older people register and vote at higher rates. Marriage generally enhances registration and voting (the exception is voting among blacks 
Discussion and Conclusion
This study has examined a very wide range of factors that contribute to variations in political participation. The results confirm that resources and rootedness-based models go a long way toward explaining the likelihood of participation. Some aspects of the political context are also significant. The main contribution here, though, is to explore group-specific effects. This has been accomplished in several ways: by pinpointing the net differences across groups after controlling for other factors, by testing whether resource and political context operate similarly for each group, and by including nativity and several contextual measures that are specific to each minority group. Although electoral participation is ultimately something that people do in isolation in a voting booth, we have emphasized that it is also a collective act. The significant associations shown here between these individual behaviors and indicators of the things group members have in common support the conclusion that the group context of participation influences choices to register and vote. The pooled analyses presented in Table 3 offer the best evidence of net differences across racial/ethnic groups. Like previous studies we have shown that all else equal, blacks register and vote at higher rates than whites. Among the largely immigrant groups with lower levels of participation, Latinos register and vote at higher rates than Asians. Unexpectedly, though, we showed that these group differences are conditional on nativity, because among immigrants Latinos participate more than either whites or Asians and almost as much as blacks.
Looked at another way, the effects of nativity are contingent on race and Hispanic origin. Although there has been speculation that the high share of immigrants in the voting-eligible Latino and Asian populations could help to explain their lower political participation, the impact of nativity is not uniform across groups and does not account for the differences between groups in participation. For whites it is the 2 nd generation that is more likely to register and vote. For other groups it is the 3+ generation that is more likely to register, but in terms of Latino voting it is the immigrant generation that stands out.
In this respect the assimilation model, which has proved useful in studying other aspects of social and economic life and posits a general direction of incorporation across generations, is only partly right. Even language (measured here as linguistic isolation), which is a strong predictor of such outcomes as occupational achievement among immigrants, has mixed effects on Latinos in this study. Living in a Spanishspeaking household reduces the likelihood of registering but increases voting. Race, Hispanic origin and immigration status apparently combine to produce distinctive collective influences on people's understanding of the political system and their engagement in it.
Other aspects of group members' shared situation also affect participation. This study included no direct measure of group consciousness or mobilization. It would be desirable to have direct measures of organized efforts to mobilize voter turnout, such as voter registration drives or campaigns on specific issues that could stimulate greater participation. We introduced the "California 1996" variable in hopes of tapping such activity, especially among Latinos. Our results confirm that Latino and white participation were boosted, but only for registration and surprisingly with the opposite effect on voting. Minority political representation (our measure of co-ethnic public officials in the metropolitan region) is a related factor, and we found strong positive effects for blacks along with some evidence that there may be an effect also for Latinos. Although the direction of causality in this finding is not certain and the Asian results run in the opposite direction, these findings should encourage further efforts to bring measures of group-based organizational activity into analysis of individual political behavior.
State voting rules are especially important because these are amenable to change, and we examined a wide range of these policies. There is a consistent effect for voter ID requirements. Some states have recently introduced new identification requirements and others are considering it. The evidence here suggests that this policy will depress white, black and Latino participation in electoral politics -and the effect could be especially strong for blacks and Latinos. On the other hand liberal absentee voting policies lead to higher voter turnout except, surprisingly, for blacks. Finally there is some evidence that a stronger immigrant service safety net is associated with greater political participation -an effect which is particularly clear for Asians for both registration and voting -but again not for blacks.
Other contextual variables, such as the requirement of bilingual ballots in some states, availability of early voting, receptivity of public opinion to immigrants, and the relative income of group members in relation to non-Hispanic whites, are not significant in any of the models that we examined for voter turn-out (and they are not included in the models reported here). Another important finding is that relative group income is surprisingly negative for all minority groups for registration. This suggests that minorities in a position of lesser economic disadvantage relative to white counterparts in a given MSA may be less likely to register. From an assimilation perspective, one would have expected the opposite effect because higher income at the individual level is associated with higher likelihood of registration.
It is valuable to learn which aspects of the policy or political context make a difference. Perhaps more important, the variations in how different groups respond to their community contexts reminds us how little we still know about the group basis of political behavior and group solidarity (Junn 2006) . This study has pinpointed several specific ways in which patterns of political participation for Asian Americans differ from other groups. All else equal, our study shows that Asians respond differently to co-ethnic representation (when it comes to registering), voter ID policy (for voter turnout), and the environment of "political threat" present in California in 1996. Moreover, Asian registration, unlike for the other minority groups, is positively affected by a robust social policy safety net for immigrants.
We have uncovered original evidence of an "empowerment effect" for blacks along with hints of the opposite effect for Asian Americans. Future research is required to investigate the social processes (and the direction of the "causal arrow") that underlie this relationship. Future work might analyze the relationship between co-ethnic representation and political participation over time or space (with attention to sub-state variation) and might consider additional variables such as coethnic group size. Furthermore, given that our multilevel analyses showed hints of a positive impact of co-ethnic officials on Latino participation (which were not robust and thus not reported in our tables), future research should probe for these effects for Latinos.
It is natural to find variations in coefficient estimates when many predictors are introduced in models for four different groups. We believe, however, that there are real differences here that remain unexplained. The challenge for researchers (from this study as well as many prior studies that allow group differences to be revealed) is to understand the specific circumstances of each group's arrival and incorporation into American society. This study shows that group differences are not solely a function of the resources and rootedness of group members or a consequence of the high proportion of immigrants among Latinos and Asians. Attention now needs to be focused on the contexts of participation faced by each group, and how their participation is facilitated or discouraged by their shared conditions in the communities where they live. Notes 1. One potentially relevant variable not used in the analysis is length of residency in the United States. This variable could only be defined for 1 st generation immigrants. It is also logically linked to the residential mobility indicator.
2. A theoretically important factor of this type that we studied but do not report here is racial isolation, based on indices calculated from tract level data. The Isolation Index measures the proportion of same-group members in the tract. Based on the literature, we expected isolation to enhance political participation by blacks, but possibly to reduce participation by Latinos and Asians. In fact, the effects turned out to be positive for both blacks and whites, while negative or mixed for Latinos and Asians. Unfortunately isolation is very highly associated with group political representation. This is not unexpected because communities with large minority populations are more likely to elect minority officials. But multicollinearity prevents inclusion of both these predictors. Timpone (1998) has argued that selection is an important consideration because voting is contingent on registration, and he recommends correction for selection bias using a probit model discussed by Dubin and Rivers (1989) . In such a model, the selection equation (registration) should contain at least one variable that is not in the outcome equation (voter turnout). To implement this procedure for the registration model, we included an indicator that is likely only to affect registration (how close in time to an election a person is allowed to register). For the voter turnout model, we added the voting policy variables that indicate states' early voting and liberalized absentee voting policy. (All the personal characteristics shown to be strong predictors of registration are also expected to influence voting, so these were included in both models.) Analyses yielded counter-intuitive results (that those who did not register would have been more likely to vote, had they registered, than those who did register) that reduced our confidence in the selection model. We then compared the magnitudes and signs of the estimated coefficients in the logit voting turnout equation (estimated only for registered voters) with coefficients in probit models with and without correction for selection bias. We found no significant differences. Therefore we conclude that the logit approach, which has easier interpretability of model coefficients, provides a sound basis for analysis in this case.
4. The multilevel models for all races replicate these findings for the impact of voter ID and absentee voting policies on voting. However, by contrast the multilevel models show no significant effects for immigrant safety net on voting while also showing negative effects of voter ID on registration.
